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Abstract
This study explores a novel channel endogenous health investment through which
monetary policy impacts growth and welfare. We use a scale-invariant Schum-
peterian growth model with a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint on R&D invest-
ment. We nd that the e¤ect of an increase in the nominal interest rate on long-run
growth crucially depends on the form of the CIA constraint. When the CIA con-
straint does not apply to medical expenditure, long-run growth does not depend
on the nominal interest rate. The result remains robust when health capital does
not need medical expenditure to produce (i.e., health capital only needs leisure to
produce). By contrast, when the CIA constraint applies to medical expenditure, an
increase in the nominal interest rate leads to a decrease in R&D and health invest-
ment, which in turn reduces the long-run growth rates of technology and output.
Nevertheless, welfare is always a decreasing function of the nominal interest rate,
and the welfare loss is larger under the CIA constraint on medical expenditure. The
results hold up with the health-in-the-utility function (HIU).
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1 Introduction
There is a large existing literature on the role of health in the process of economic de-
velopment (see elaboration below). In this paper we contribute by analyzing the e¤ect
of monetary policy on health capital accumulation in a Schumpeterian growth model. In
so doing, we reveal a novel channel for monetary policy to impact economic growth and
welfare. We follow Chu and Cozzi (2014) and Chu et al. (2015) to model money demand
via a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint on R&D investment. We nd that the e¤ect of an
increase in the nominal interest rate on long-run growth crucially depends on the form
of the CIA constraint. When the CIA constraint does not apply to medical expendi-
ture, long-run growth does not depend on the nominal interest rate, but welfare depends
negatively on the nominal interest rate. The result remains robust when health capital
does not need medical expenditure to produce (i.e., health capital only needs leisure to
produce). By contrast, under the CIA constraint on medical expenditure, an increase in
the nominal interest rate leads to a decrease in R&D and health investment, which in
turn reduces the long-run growth rates of technology and output. The welfare loss is also
larger. The results hold up with the health-in-the-utility function (HIU).
It is generally the case that with a CIA constraint on R&D investment, a higher
nominal interest rate would decrease R&D labor and thereby the growth rate of output
(see e.g., Chu and Cozzi, 2014; Chu et al., 2017). For instance, Chu et al. (2017) illustrate
that the accumulation of human capital amplies the negative e¤ect of a higher nominal
interest rate on growth. The mechanism of our nding is as follows.
To remove the scale e¤ect in the innovation process to be consistent with the relative
constant growth rate of total factor productivity in developed countries, authors usually
assume a rising R&D di¢ culty. For instance, as discussed in Chu et al. (2017), Segerstrom
(1998) has considered an industry-specic index of R&D di¢ culty; Venturini (2012) has
provided empirical evidence based on industry-level data that supports the presence of
increasing R&D di¢ culty. We also assume that there is an increasing-complexity e¤ect of
technology. Specically, the aggregate arrival rate of innovation depends on the ratio of
the level of health to the level of technology (to capture the increasing-complexity e¤ect
of technology and remove the scale e¤ect of health capital on innovation) as well as the
share of R&D employment (as in Schumpeterian growth models, see Aghion and Howitt,
1998, ch. 2; Chu and Cozzi, 2014).
In our model, the accumulation of health capital is not a¤ected by the increase in
the nominal interest rate. That is, the share of e¤ective labor devoted to leisure does
not depend on the nominal interest rate. When there is an increase in the nominal
interest rate, the share of e¤ective labor employed by R&D decreases, all else equal. This
happens because of the CIA constraint on R&D. Because entrepreneurs have to borrow
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from households to pay the wage bill of R&D workers, an increase in the nominal interest
rate would increase the borrowing cost of entrepreneurs, ending up shifting labor from
R&D to manufacturing. As labor reallocates from R&D to manufacturing, the aggregate
arrival rate of innovation decreases, which in turn reduces the aggregate level of technology.
When the ratio of the level of health to the level of technology increases, the complexity of
technology relative to human health decreases, ending up increasing the aggregate arrival
rate of innovation. On the balanced growth path, the e¤ect of the decrease in R&D share
of labor due to an increase in the nominal interest rate on the growth rate of technology
is totally o¤set by that of the increase in the ratio of the level of health to the level
of technology, leaving the growth rates of technology and output unchanged. However,
an increase in the nominal interest rate decreases the initial level of output, ending up
lowering welfare.
Our results concerning growth are in contrast to the ndings of Chu et al. (2017).
The di¤erence in ndings can be explained as follows. In Chu et al. (2017), an increase
in the nominal interest rate would also decrease the share of skilled labor (i.e., human
capital) employed by R&D. However, when the demand for unskilled labor increases, the
return to unskilled labor relative to skilled labor increases, people would devote less time
to education that produces skilled labor. As a result, the accumulation of human capital
is negatively a¤ected by the increase in the nominal interest, amplifying the e¤ect of an
increase in the nominal interest rate on innovation. By contrast, the allocation of time
(or health capital) between work (either in manufacturing or in R&D) and leisure is not
a¤ected by the increase in the nominal interest rate. Thus, the accumulation of health
capital is not a¤ected by the increase in the nominal interest rate, decreasing the relative
complexity of innovation and thereby increasing the aggregate arrival rate of innovation,
which in turn helps to nullify the negative e¤ect of an increase in the nominal interest rate
on R&D. The result holds up when the accumulation/production of health needs both
medical expenditure and leisure.
However, the results will di¤er when the medical expenditure is subject to the CIA
constraint. In other words, when the medical expenditure is a cash good instead of a
credit good, it will amplify the negative e¤ect of an increase in the nominal interest
rate. An increase in the nominal interest rate raises the cost of medical expenditure via
the CIA constraint and leads to a reallocation of output from medical expenditure to
consumption. Moreover, the share of e¤ective labor supply devoted to leisure decreases
as the nominal interest rate increases. This is because leisure and medical expenditures
are complementary in producing health. The decrease in one input would decrease the
marginal product of the other input, and agents would invest less in the other input as
well. Therefore, the growth rate of health capital decreases. As the growth rate of output
is twice those of health capital and technology, the decrease in the growth rate of output
2
is twice as large as those of health capital and technology. Moreover, the welfare loss
would also be larger.
This study relates to the large literature on health (e.g., Grossman, 1972; Ehrlich and
Chuma, 1990; van Zon and Muysken, 2001; Huang, He, and Hung, 2013; Huang and
He, 2015; Halliday et al., 2017; Kelly, 2017). Early studies, such as Grossman (1972),
have discussed the inputs of health status and the e¤ect of health for consumers. Since
then a growing literature has emerged. Generally speaking, health generates utility for
consumers (i.e., HIU) (see e.g., Hall and Jones, 2007); health could increase labor supply
by decreasing sick time (see e.g., Huang and He, 2015; Halliday et al., 2017); health could
help productivity increase as in van Zon and Muysken (2001); health could also increase
life expectancy or survival probability as in Hall and Jones (2007). The seminal study
of Hall and Jones illustrates that the marginal utility of health increases while the mar-
ginal utility of consumption decreases as people get richer, which causes the sharp rise
in health spending. Kelly (2017) studies health insurance via a neoclassical approach.
Bloom et al. (2003) nd that health measured as life expectancy signicantly promotes
growth. Madson (2017) uses a unique annual dataset covering the period 18002011
for 21 OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries and
nds that health improvements can account for approximately a third of the produc-
tivity advances in the OECD countries since 1865, and that these improvements have
been inuential for enhancement in education, savings, innovations, life expectancy, and
democracy.
This study also relates to the literature on ination/monetary policy and endogenous
growth (for recent studies, see e.g., Chu and Cozzi, 2014; Chu et al., 2015; He, 2015;
Huang, Chang, and Ji, 2015; He and Zou, 2016; Arawatari, Hori, and Mino, 2017; Chu et
al., 2017; Huang, Yang, and Cheng, 2017; Chu et al., 2018; He, 2018). Chu et al. (2017)
study human capital accumulation in a scale-invariant monetary Schumpeterian growth
model. As discussed in many existing studies (e.g., van Zon and Muysken, 2001), health
and human capital share many similar features such as being benecial for productivity
growth. Therefore, our work together with Chu et al. enhances our understanding the
role of health and human capital in the process of economic development.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the monetary Schum-
peterian growth model. Section 3 analyzes the growth and welfare e¤ects of monetary
policy. The nal section concludes.
2 A Monetary Schumpeterian Model with Health
For monetary policies to play a role, we need to introduce money into the Schumpeterian
growth models. Built on existing studies (e.g., Chu and Cozzi, 2014; Chu et al., 2017),
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we model money with a CIA constraint on R&D expenditure.
In this section, we follow the human capital setup in Chu et al. (2017). That is, we
assume that health only needs leisure time to produce. We present the basic model for
the following reasons. One the one hand, health is in many aspects like human capital.
For instance, both health and human capital can increase e¤ective labor supply. They
both need time to produce. On the other hand, the basic model allows us to see clearly
the e¤ect of monetary policy on health accumulation and long-run growth.
2.1 The Households
At time t, the population size of each household is xed at 1. There is a unit continuum
of identical households, who have a lifetime utility function as
U =
Z 1
0
e t ln (ct) dt, (1)
where ct is per capita real consumption of nal goods (numeraire) at time t.  > 0 is the
rate of time preference.
Each household maximizes her lifetime utility given in equation (1) subject to the
asset-accumulation equation given by

at +

mt = rtat + wtNt   ct   tmt + itbt +  t, (2)
where at is the real value of equity shares in monopolistic intermediate goods rms owned
by each member of households; rt and wt are the rate of real interest and wage respectively;
Nt is e¤ective labor supplied to production and R&D. ct is per capita consumption. mt
is the real money balance held by each person, and t is the cost of holding money (i.e.,
the ination rate). In (2), each person also receives a per capita lump-sum transfer of the
seigniorage revenue  t from the government (or pay a lump-sum tax if  t < 0). The CIA
constraint is given by bt  mt, where bt is the amount of money borrowed by entrepreneurs
to nance R&D, and the rate of return is it (the nominal interest rate).
Following the existing literature (e.g., Grossman, 1972; Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; van
Zon and Muysken, 2001; Hall and Jones, 2007; Huang, He, and Hung, 2013; Halliday et
al., 2017), we assume that the level of health ht increases the amount of e¤ective labor
services a person can supply:
Nt + lt = 1  ht = ht, (3)
where lt is the amount of e¤ective labor allocated to leisure, and each person has one unit
of time endowment. The accumulation equation of health status/stock ht is given by

ht = lt, (4)
4
where  is the productivity parameter for health capital investment. Chu et al. (2017)
made a similar assumption on human capital accumulation. This assumption is justied as
follows. People spend their leisure time on physical exercises, relaxation, and meditation.
This is similar to Chu et al. (2017) who assume that people spend their leisure time
studying. Physical exercises build up health (both physical and mental) and relaxation
and meditation are conducive to mental health, just as studying accumulates human
capital.
We can derive the no-arbitrage condition (i.e., the Fisher equation) it = t + rt (see
the Appendix for the derivation of a more complete model in Section 3.2). The optimality
condition for consumption is
1
ct
= t, (5)
where t the Hamiltonian co-state variable on (2). The intertemporal optimality condition
is
 

t
t
= rt   . (6)
We also have the arbitrage condition between investment in asset holding and that in
health:
rt =  +

wt
wt
. (7)
2.2 The Final Goods Sector
The nal goods sector is competitive. The production function of the nal goods rms is
given by
yt = exp
Z 1
0
lnxt (j) dj

, (8)
where xt (j) denotes intermediate goods j 2 [0; 1]. The nal goods rms maximize their
prot, taking the price of each intermediate good j, denoted pt (j), as given. The demand
function for xt (j) is
xt (j) = yt=pt (j) . (9)
2.3 The Intermediate Goods Sector
As clearly elaborated in Chu and Cozzi (2014), there is a unit continuum of industries
producing di¤erentiated intermediate goods. Each industry is temporarily dominated by
an industry leader until the arrival of the next innovation, and the owner of the new
innovation becomes the next industry leader. The leader in industry j has the following
production function:
xt(j) = 
qt(j)Nx;t(j). (10)
5
The parameter  > 1 is the step size of a productivity improvement, and qt(j) is the
number of productivity improvements that have occurred in industry j as of time t.
Nx;t(j) is production labor in industry j. As Chu and Cozzi (2014) point out, equation
(10) adopts a cost-reducing view of vertical innovation. Given qt(j), the marginal cost of
production for the industry leader in industry j is mct(j) = wt=qt(j).
Standard Bertrand price competition leads to a prot-maximizing price pt (j) deter-
mined by a markup  (the step size of innovation) over the marginal cost. The amount
of monopolistic prot is
t (j) =

   1


pt (j)xt (j) =

   1


yt. (11)
The labor income from production is
wtNx;t(j) =

1


pt (j)xt (j) =

1


yt. (12)
2.4 Research Arbitrage
Research arbitrage is similar to Chu and Cozzi (2014). In a symmetric equilibrium, we
have t (j) = t. We denote vt (j) as the value of the monopolistic rm in industry j. In
a symmetric equilibrium, vt (j) = vt. The no-arbitrage condition for vt is
rtvt = t +

vt   tvt. (13)
Equation (13) says that the return of holding an innovation, rtvt, equals the sum of the
ow prot of innovation, t, and potential capital gain (

vt), less the expected capital loss,
tvt, where t is the arrival rate of the next innovation.
With the CIA constraint on R&D, following Chu and Cozzi (2014), the zero-expected-
prot condition of R&D rm k 2 [0; 1] in each industry is
t (k) vt = (1 + i)wtNr;t(k), (14)
where Nr;t(k) is the amount of labor hired by R&D rm k, and the rm-level innovation
rate per unit time (i.e., t (k)) is t (k) =
'
Zt
Nr;t(k), where Zt is the aggregate level
of technology. This assumption is made to remove the scale e¤ect of health capital on
steady-state growth (see also Chu et al., 2017). The aggregate arrival rate of innovation
is
t =
Z 1
0
t (k) dk =
'
Zt
Nr;t = '
ht
Zt
Nr;t
ht
= 	nr;t, (15)
where we dene a transformed variable 	  'ht=Zt, and another transformed variable
6
nr;t  Nr;t=ht (the share of R&D labor in total e¤ective labor supply). Similarly, the share
of production labor would be nx;t = Nx;t=ht.
2.5 The Monetary Authority
The monetary authority exogenously chooses the monetary growth rate

M t=Mt. As dis-
cussed in Chu and Cozzi (2014) and Chu et al. (2017), it is equivalent to the case in which
the nominal interest rate is chosen as the policy instrument because it =

M t=Mt + .
2.6 The General Equilibrium
As in Chu and Cozzi (2014), the general equilibrium is a time path of prices fpt (j) , rt, wt, it, vtg
and allocations fct, mt, bt, yt, lt, ht, xt (j) , Nt, Nx;t (j) , Nr;t (k)g, which satisfy the fol-
lowing conditions at each instance of time:
 households maximize utility taking prices frt, wt, itg as given;
 competitive nal-goods rms maximize prot taking fpt (j)g as given;
 monopolistic intermediate-goods rms choose fNx;t (j) , pt (j)g to maximize prot
taking fwtg as given;
 R&D rms choose fNr;t (k)g to maximize expected prot taking fwt, it, vtg as given;
 labor market clears (that is, Nt + lt = Nx;t +Nr;t + lt = ht);
 nal goods market clears (that is, yt = ct);
 the value of monopolistic rms adds up to the value of households assets (i.e.,
vt = at).
 the real money balance borrowed by R&D entrepreneurs from the household is
bt = wtNr;t.
3 The E¤ect of Monetary Policy
Because balanced growth rate is pinned down by the share of labor employed by R&D
rms, we solve for the equilibrium labor allocation. The equilibrium labor allocation is sta-
tionary on a balanced growth path. Using conditions

t=t = g, t = (1 + i) (+ )wtNr;t,
(11), (12), (14), and (15), we end up with
(   1)nx = (1 + i) (nr + =	) . (16)
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The labor market clearing condition is
nr + nx = 1  l
h
. (17)
Solving (16)-(17) yields the equilibrium labor allocation as
nr =
(   1)
 + i

1  l
h
+

	

  
	
, (18)
nx =
1 + i
 + i

1  l
h
+

	

. (19)
In this paper we focus exclusively on the balanced growth path along which each
variable grows at a constant rate. Plugging equation (10) into (8), we have
yt = exp
Z 1
0
qt (j) dj ln 

Nx = exp
Z t
0
vdv ln 

Nx = ZtNx, (20)
where Zt  exp
R t
0
vdv ln 

is the level of aggregate technology. The growth rate of Zt
is
gz = t ln  = 	nr;t ln , (21)
which is linear in the share of labor employed by R&D rms, as in standard Schumpeterian
growth models (see e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1998, ch. 2; Chu and Cozzi, 2014). On
the balanced growth path, the constant gz = (	 ln )nr;t implies that 	 is a constant.
Therefore, ht and Zt must grow at the same rate: gz = gh. Equation (20) shows that
gy = gz + gh. Therefore, we have
gy = 2gh = 2
l
h
, (22)
where we have used equation (4). Therefore, the balanced growth rate is a constant if l=h
is stationary. Combining equations (5), (6), (7), and (22) yields
gh =

ht
ht
=    . (23)
Combining equations (23) and (22) yields
l
h
=
   

. (24)
Equation (24) shows that the value of l=h is stationary. Moreover, the stationary value
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of l=h is not a function of the nominal interest rate. The growth rate of output would be
gy = 2 (   ) , (25)
which shows that the growth rate of output is not a function of the nominal interest rate.
Given that gz = gh = gy=2, both the growth rates of health capital and technology are
not a function of the nominal interest rate.
Proposition 1 In our model, the growth rates of output, health capital and aggregate
technology do not depend on the nominal interest rate.
Proof: Proven in text. Q.E.D.
Our results are in contrast to the ndings of Chu et al. (2017) and Chu and Cozzi
(2014). It is generally the case that with a CIA constraint on R&D investment, a higher
nominal interest rate would decrease R&D labor and thereby the growth rate of output.
However, when there is health capital, the negative e¤ect of an increase in the nominal
interest rate is o¤set by the accumulation of health capital. To explain the intuition of
the above results, we rst show the following. We have
(	 ln )

(   1)
 + i

1  l
h
+

	

  
	

= gz = gh =    , (26)
which would enable us to solve for 	 (the ratio of health capital to technology) as
	  'ht
Zt
=
(   ) ( + i) +  ln  (1 + i)
(1   + ) (   1) ln  , (27)
which illustrates that 	 (the ratio of health capital to technology) is an increasing function
of the nominal interest rate.
As discussed in Chu et al. (2017), Segerstrom (1998) has considered an industry-
specic index of R&D di¢ culty; Venturini (2012) has provided empirical evidence based
on industry-level data that supports the presence of increasing R&D di¢ culty. We also
follow Chu et al. (2017) to capture an increasing-complexity e¤ect of technology. Doing
so serves to remove a scale e¤ect of health capital in the innovation process (see Jones,
1999, and Laincz and Peretto, 2006, for a discussion of scale e¤ects in R&D-based growth
models). The reason of doing so is similar to the argument of Chu et al. (2017): The level
of human health has been increasing in many developed countries, but this increase in
the level of human health is not accompanied by a rise in the growth rate of total factor
productivity.
Specically, the rm-level arrival rate of innovation is t (k) =
'
Zt
Nr;t(k) = '
ht
Zt
Nr;t(k)
ht
.
Therefore, the aggregate arrival rate of innovation is t = ' htZt
Nr;t
ht
. We have dened
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	  ' ht
Zt
and nr;t  Nr;tht . Therefore, the aggregate arrival rate of innovation positively
depends on the ratio of the level of health to the level of technology ( ht
Zt
) as well as the
share of e¤ective labor in R&D (nr;t). In our model, the accumulation of health capital
is not a¤ected by the increase in the nominal interest rate. That is, the share of e¤ective
labor devoted to leisure does not depend on the nominal interest rate. When there is
an increase in the nominal interest rate, the share of e¤ective labor employed by R&D
(i.e., nr;t) decreases, as illustrated in (18), all else equal. This happens because of the
CIA constraint on R&D. Because entrepreneurs have to borrow from households to pay
the wage bill of R&D workers, an increase in the nominal interest rate would increase the
borrowing cost of entrepreneurs, ending up shifting labor from R&D to manufacturing.
As labor reallocates from R&D to manufacturing, the aggregate arrival rate of innovation
decreases, which in turn reduces the aggregate level of technology. When the ratio of
the level of health to the level of technology ( h
Z
) increases, the complexity of technology
relative to human health decreases, ending up increasing the aggregate arrival rate of
innovation. This e¤ect is illustrated in (27), where 	 is an increasing function of the
nominal interest rate. On the balanced growth path, the e¤ect of the decrease in R&D
share of labor due to an increase in the nominal interest rate on the growth rate of
technology is totally o¤set by that of the increase in the ratio of the level of health to the
level of technology, leaving the growth rates of technology and output unchanged.
Our results are in contrast to the ndings of Chu et al. (2017) who nd that an increase
in the nominal interest rate would decrease the growth rates of technology, human capital
and output. The di¤erence in ndings can be explained as follows. In Chu et al., (2017),
an increase in the nominal interest rate would also decrease the share of skilled labor
(i.e., human capital) employed by R&D. However, when the demand for unskilled labor
increases, the return to unskilled labor relative to skilled labor increases, people would
devote less time to education to produce skilled labor. As a result, the accumulation of
human capital is negatively a¤ected by the increase in the nominal interest, amplifying the
e¤ect of an increase in the nominal interest rate on innovation. By contrast, the allocation
of time (or health capital) between work (either in manufacturing or in R&D) and leisure
is not a¤ected by the increase in the nominal interest rate. Thus, the accumulation of
health capital is not a¤ected by the increase in the nominal interest rate, decreasing
the relative complexity of innovation and thereby increasing the aggregate arrival rate of
innovation, which in turn helps to nullify the negative e¤ect of an increase in the nominal
interest rate on R&D due to the CIA constraint.
To summarize, the return to education and thereby the accumulation of human capital
in Chu et al. (2017) is a¤ected by the relative return between skilled and unskilled labor.
Such relative return between skilled and unskilled labor is absent in our model, which is
reasonable because an individual, be it skilled or unskilled worker, needs the same amount
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of leisure to stay healthy or accumulate health capital. Therefore, the amplication of
the negative e¤ect of an increase in the nominal interest rate is absent in our model. Our
nding is not only consistent with the empirical evidence in Chu and Lai (2013) and Chu
et al. (2015), who provide empirical evidence for a negative relationship between ination
and R&D, but also consistent with the mixed evidence on the e¤ect of the ination rate
on the growth rate in existing studies.1 For instance, some authors nd a negative e¤ect
of ination on growth (e.g., Chu et al., 2014), while others nd a positive e¤ect of ination
on growth (e.g., Bullard and Keating, 2005; He and Zou, 2016).
Proposition 2 The welfare is a decreasing function of the nominal interest rate.
Proof. Imposing balanced growth on (1) yields
U =
1


ln (Z0Nx;0) +
g


, (28)
where Z0 is the aggregate technology at time 0, and Nx;0 is the production labor at time
0. Given Proposition 1 (i.e., the growth rate does not depend on the nominal interest
rate), the nominal interest rate impacts the welfare through the level e¤ect on the initial
output level y0 = Z0Nx;0. That is, we have
sign

@U
@i

= sign

@ ln (y0)
@i

. (29)
As we discussed above, the accumulation of health is independent of the nominal
interest rate, therefore, h0 is not a¤ected by the nominal interest i. Therefore, we have
y0 =

Z0
h0
Nx;0
h0

h20 =

'
	0
nx;0

h20 =) (30)
ln (y0) =   ln	0 + lnnx;0 + ln'+ 2 lnh0. (31)
Therefore, we have
@ ln (y0)
@i
=
@ lnnx;0
@i
  @ ln (	0)
@i
=
1
nx;0
@nx;0
@i
  1
	0
@	0
@i
. (32)
Using equations (17), (24), and (26), it can be shown that @nx;0=@i > 0 and
@	0
@i
=
	0
nr;0
@nx;0
@i
. (33)
1The balanced growth rate and thereby the real interest rate does not depend on the nominal interest
rate in our model. The Fisher equation i = r+ indicates that the nominal interest rate and the ination
rate are positively correlated.
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Plugging (33) into (32) yields
@ ln (y0)
@i
=

1
nx;0
  1
nr;0

@nx;0
@i
< 0, (34)
where the last inequality holds because production/manufacturing labor is usually much
larger than the R&D labor. Therefore, welfare is a decreasing function of the nominal
interest rate. Q.E.D.
The intuition can be seen from (28). When the nominal interest rate increases, the
CIA constraint on R&D investment would shift labor away from R&D to manufacturing,
ending up increasing Nx;0. However, this e¤ect is dominated by the decrease in the arrival
rate of innovation because less labor employed by R&D decreases the arrival rate of
innovation (i.e., the decrease in the initial level of technology Z0). Although the growth
rate remains constant, the initial level of output decreases, ending up lowering the welfare.
Our model is similar to Chu et al. (2017). Therefore, it becomes very important to
explain the key areas where the present paper is deviating from their model, the rationale
for making those changes in assumptions and what it leads to in terms of the results. For
instance, throughout Chu et al. (2017), it is maintained that there is a CIA constraint
on consumption along with R&D investment. However, in the present paper there is no
CIA constraint on consumption. It is worth explaining why we are doing away with the
assumption of a CIA constraint on consumption and whether it has any bearing on the
results.
We can show that Propositions 1 and 2 still hold up when the CIA constraint also
applies to consumption (i.e., the CIA constraint is ct + bt  mt). In this case, only
equation (2) needs to be modied as
1
ct
= t (1 + i) , (35)
while the rest of the model remains the same. Therefore, Propositions 1 and 2 still
hold up. The intuition is as follows. Without leisure in the utility function (i.e., labor
supply is inelastic), the e¤ect of the nominal interest rate operates only through the CIA
constraint on R&D investment. That is, under inelastic labor supply, the CIA constraint
on consumption has no e¤ect on labor supply and labor allocation (between manufacturing
and R&D) (see also discussions in Chu and Cozzi, 2014). This is because the channel for
the CIA constraint on consumption to impact the economy is through the consumption-
leisure choice that is absent in our model. Therefore, the nominal interest rate through
the CIA constraint on consumption has no e¤ect on growth and welfare. To summarize,
the di¤erence between our ndings and those in Chu et al. (2017) is not driven by the
CIA constraint on consumption.
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It is worth discussing that our predictions in Propositions 1 and 2 remain robust to
the consideration of the fact that the accumulation (production) of health needs both
medical expenditure (a sacrice of consumption) and leisure, as elaborated on in the
following section.
3.1 Medical Expenditure and Leisure as Two Inputs of Health
Production
Now each household maximizes her lifetime utility given in equation (1) subject to the
asset-accumulation equation given by

at +

mt = rtat + wtNt   ct   et   tmt + itbt +  t, (36)
where ct and et are per capita consumption and medical expenditure, respectively. The
other variables are the same as before.
Labor market condition is still (3). However, now lt (the amount of e¤ective labor
allocated to leisure) would be combined with medical expenditure to produce a high level
of health (see e.g., van Zon and Muysken, 2001; Huang, He, and Hung, 2013; Huang
and He, 2015; Halliday et al., 2017; Kelly, 2017). The accumulation equation of health
status/stock ht is given by

ht = l

t

et
wt
1 
, (37)
where  is the productivity parameter for health capital investment, and  2 (0; 1) is
a parameter governing the share of leisure in producing health. Medical expenditure
is scaled by the wage rate to remove the scale e¤ect in health capital accumulation.
Otherwise, the growth rate would not be a constant (which violates the balanced growth
rate observed in advanced economies).
The optimal condition for consumption and the intertemporal optimality condition
remain the same as in equations (5) and (6). The optimal condition for the ratio of
medical expenditure to the market value of leisure (the product of the wage rate and
leisure) is
et
wtlt
=
1  

, (38)
which shows that the ratio of medical expenditure to the market value of leisure is sta-
tionary, which is not a function of the nominal interest rate.
We also have the arbitrage condition between investment in asset holding and that in
health:
rt = 

1  

1 
+

wt
wt
: (39)
The growth rate of Zt is still gz = t ln  = 	nr;t ln , which is linear in the share
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of labor employed by R&D rms. On the balanced growth path, the constant gz =
(	 ln )nr;t implies that 	 is a constant, which yields gz = gh. Equation (20) shows that
gy = gz + gh. Therefore, we have
gy = 2gh = 2
l
h

1  

1 
, (40)
where we used equations (37) and (38). Therefore, the balanced growth rate is a constant
if l=h is stationary. Combining equations (40) and (39) yields
2
l
h

1  

1 
+  = 

1  

1 
+

wt
wt
. (41)
On the balanced growth path, we have

w=w =

h=h, given gy = 2gh. Therefore,
equation (41) becomes

l
h

1  

1 
+  = 

1  

1 
, (42)
which solves for the stationary value of l=h, which is not a function of the nominal interest
rate. The growth rate of output would be
gy = 2
"


1  

1 
  
#
, (43)
which is independent of the nominal interest rate. Given gz = gh = gy=2, the growth rates
of health capital and technology are not a function of the nominal interest rate.
Proposition 3 Even if health capital needs medical expenditure and leisure to produce,
the growth rates of output, health capital and aggregate technology still do not depend on
the nominal interest rate. Moreover, welfare is still a decreasing function of the nominal
interest rate.
Proof: The growth path is proven in text. The proof of the welfare part remains identical
to that in Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
Concerning growth, the mechanism and its di¤erence from that in Chu et al. (2017)
remain similar to those at end of Proposition 1. Generally speaking, the accumulation
of health capital is not a¤ected by the increase in the nominal interest rate, decreasing
the relative complexity of innovation and thereby increasing the aggregate arrival rate of
innovation, which in turn helps to nullify the negative e¤ect of an increase in the nominal
interest rate on R&D due to the CIA constraint.
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It is worth discussing the following. Although our predictions in Propositions 1 and
2 do not depend on the accumulation/production of health, they crucially depend on the
form of the CIA constraint, as elaborated on in the following section.
3.2 CIA on Medical Expenditure
Building on Section 3.1, now the CIA constraint is given by et + bt  mt, where the
parameter  > 0 determines the strength of the CIA constraint on medical expenditure.
Here we assume that the medical expenditure is subject to the CIA constraint.
The optimal condition for consumption and the intertemporal optimality condition
remain the same as in equations (5) and (6). The optimal condition for the ratio of
medical expenditure to the market value of leisure (the product of the wage rate and
leisure) is (see the Appendix for derivation)
et
wtlt
=
1  

1
(1 + it)
, (44)
which shows that the ratio of medical expenditure to the market value of leisure is a
decreasing function of the nominal interest rate. This is expected because medical expen-
diture is subject to the CIA constraint.
We also have the arbitrage condition between investment in asset holding and that in
health:
rt = 

et
wlt
1 
+

wt
wt
. (45)
We still have gz = gh = gy=2, and
gy = 2gh = 2
l
h

et
wlt
1 
, (46)
where we used equation (37). Equation (44) pins down the stationary value of e=wl.
Therefore, the balanced growth rate is a constant if l=h is stationary.
Combining equations (46) and (45) yields
2
l
h

et
wlt
1 
+  = 

et
wlt
1 
+

wt
wt
. (47)
On the balanced growth path, we have

w=w =

h=h, given gy = 2gh. Therefore,
equation (47) becomes

l
h

et
wlt
1 
+  = 

et
wlt
1 
, (48)
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which solves for the stationary value of l=h, which is a decreasing function of the nominal
interest rate. As the nominal interest rate increase, the share of e¤ective labor supply
devoted to leisure decreases. The growth rate of output would be
gy = 2
"


1  

1
(1 + it)
1 
  
#
, (49)
Equation (49) shows that the growth rate of output is a decreasing function of the
nominal interest rate. Given that gz = gh = gy=2, both the growth rates of health capital
and technology are a decreasing function of the nominal interest rate.
Proposition 4 Under the CIA constraint on medical expenditure, the growth rates of
output, health capital and aggregate technology are all a decreasing function of the nominal
interest rate.
Proof: Proven in text. Q.E.D.
The intuition of the above results can be explained as follows. There is a CIA constraint
on R&D investment and medical expenditure. Health capital/health status needs medical
expenditure (a sacrice in consumption) and leisure to produce. The benet of good
health is that it increases e¤ective labor supply. An increase in the nominal interest rate
raises the cost of medical expenditure via the CIA constraint and leads to a reallocation
of output from medical expenditure to consumption. Moreover, l=h (the share of e¤ective
labor supply devoted to leisure) decreases as the nominal interest rate increases. This is
because leisure and medical expenditures are complementary in producing health. The
decrease in one input would decrease the marginal product of the other input, and agents
would invest less in the other input as well. Therefore, the growth rate of health capital
decreases. As the growth rate of output is twice those of health capital and technology,
the decrease in the growth rate of output is twice as large as those of health capital
and technology. On the ip side, a decrease in the nominal interest rate would increase
the growth rates of health capital and technology, and the increase in output growth
would be twice as large. This happens because output is a product of technology and
production labor. An increase in health increases the e¤ective amount of labor used in
R&D and decreases the relative complexity of innovation, ending up increasing the growth
rate of technology. Additionally, the increase in health increases the e¤ective amount of
labor used in production, doubling the e¤ect of an increase in health. In other words,
when the medical expenditure is a cash good instead of a credit good, it will amplify the
negative/positive e¤ect of an increase/decrease in the nominal interest rate.
Concerning welfare, considering Proposition 2 and equation (28), one can see that an
increase in the nominal interest decreases the initial level of output besides the growth
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rate of output. Therefore, with the CIA constraint on medical expenditure, the welfare
loss would be larger.
3.3 Health-in-the-Utility Function
Building on Section 3.2., at time t, the population size of each household is xed at 1.
There is a unit continuum of identical households, who have a lifetime utility function as
U =
Z 1
0
e t [ln (ct) + j ln (ht)] dt, (50)
where ht is per capita health stock at time t. j > 0 governs the preference for health
relative to consumption.
The arbitrage condition between investment in asset holding and that in health be-
comes
rt =
j
h
+ 

et
wlt
1 
+

wt
wt
, (51)
where  is the co-state variable on (36).
We still have gz = gh = gy=2, and
gy = 2gh = 2
l
h

et
wlt
1 
. (52)
Combining equations (52) and (51) yields
2
l
h

et
wlt
1 
+  =
j
h
+ 

et
wlt
1 
+

wt
wt
. (53)
On the balanced growth path, we have

w=w =

h=h, given gy = 2gh. Therefore,
equation (53) becomes

l
h

et
wlt
1 
+  =
j
h
+ 

et
wlt
1 
. (54)
The growth rate of output would be
gy = 2
"
j
h
+ 

et
wlt
1 
  
#
. (55)
Comparing to cases where health is not in the utility function, the balanced growth rate
is higher with the HIU. This is because with the HIU (i.e., j > 0), investing in health has
an additional benet (i.e., having a good health directly increases utility level). Therefore,
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consumers would like to invest more in health, ending up pushing up the balanced growth
rate.
However, it is still obvious that growth of output is still a decreasing function of the
nominal interest rate when the CIA constraint applies to the medical expenditure. Using
(55), the growth rate of output would be
gy = 2
"
j
h
+ 

1  

1
(1 + i)
1 
  
#
, (56)
which is a decreasing function of the nominal interest rate.
By contrast, when there is no CIA constraint on the medical expenditure, combining
(38) and (55) yields the growth rate of output as
gy = 2
"
j
h
+ 

1  

1 
  
#
, (57)
which is not a function of the nominal interest rate.
4 Conclusions
In this study we investigate the role of endogenous health investment in a monetary
Schumpeterian growth model. In so doing, we reveal a novel channel through which
monetary policy could impact economic growth and welfare. We nd that the e¤ect of an
increase in the nominal interest rate on long-run growth crucially depends on the form
of the CIA constraint. When the CIA does not apply to medical expenditure, long-run
growth does not depend on the nominal interest rate. The result remains robust when
health capital does not need medical expenditure to produce (i.e., health capital only
needs leisure to produce). By contrast, when the CIA applies to medical expenditure, an
increase in the nominal interest rate leads to a decrease in R&D and health investment,
which in turn reduces the long-run growth rates of technology and output. Concerning
welfare, it is always a decreasing function of the nominal interest rate. However, with the
CIA constraint on medical expenditure, the welfare loss is larger. The results hold up
with the HIU.
As discussed in the introduction, health and human capital share many similar fea-
tures. Therefore, our work together with Chu et al. (2017) enhances our understanding
the role of health and human capital in the process of economic development. The pol-
icy implication is as follows. Health capital is essential for promoting economic growth,
but peoples health investment may be a¤ected by monetary policy. In our study, health
capital needs medical expenditure and leisure to produce, and medical expenditure may
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also be subject to the CIA constraint. When this happens, a higher nominal interest
rate (an expansionary monetary policy) would incur an additional cost for health capital
investment. A resultant lower rate of health capital accumulation may retard growth and
reduce welfare. This important channel should be taken into account in evaluating the
e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth and social welfare. There may be other
important issues concerning the role of health in the process of economic development,
and we leave them to future research.
Appendix.
Householdsdynamic optimization: The Hamiltonian is
Ht = ln ct+t [rtat + wt (ht   lt)  ct   et   tmt + itbt +  t]+vt (mt   bt   et)+tlt

et
wt
1 
.
The rst-order conditions include
@Ht
@ct
=
1
ct
  t = 0, (58)
@Ht
@et
=  t   vt + (1  ) tlt e t w 1t = 0, (59)
@Ht
@lt
=  twt + tl 1t

et
wt
1 
= 0, (60)
@Ht
@bt
= tit   vt = 0, (61)
@Ht
@at
= trt = t  

t, (62)
@Ht
@mt
=  tt + vt = t  

t, (63)
@Ht
@ht
= twt = t  

t. (64)
(58) yields
ct =
1
t
. (65)
(62) gives the intertemporal optimality condition:
 

t
t
= rt   . (66)
Combining (59), (60) and (61) yields
e
wl
=
1  

1
(1 + it)
. (67)
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Substituting (61) into (63) and equating it to (62) yield it = t + rt, where it is the
nominal interest rate. Taking the logarithm of (60) and di¤erentiating it with respect to
t yield

t
t
+

wt
wt
=

t
t
+ (1  )

(e=wl)
e=wl
. (68)
Substituting (62), (64) and (60) into (68) yields
rt = 

et
wlt
1 
+

wt
wt
  (1  )

(e=wl)
e=wl
= 

et
wlt
1 
+

wt
wt
, (69)
where the last equality uses (67).
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